Golden State Warriors

Golden State Warriors: 3 takeaways from Game 4 vs. San Antonio Spurs

Updated Mar. 4, 2020 4:50 p.m. ET

Fansided, Simon Cherin-Gordon/FanSided via Hoops Habit

For each remaining game of the Golden State Warriors' playoff run, we will be breaking down three takeaways. We continue with their Game 4 win over the San Antonio Spurs.

The Golden State Warriors made history Monday night, beating the San Antonio Spurs 129-115. In doing so, they became the first team to go undefeated en route to the NBA Finals in 16 years.

As we did at the end of the conference semifinals, our three takeaways will have a wider scope than normal as we look back at the 2017 Western Conference Finals that were and ahead to the NBA Finals that will be.

1. Spurs' immunity to criticism clear after Leonard injury

Kawhi Leonard's brilliance this season hid many of San Antonio's flaws. Yet the narrative on Leonard and the Spurs was largely the opposite of this: San Antonio had the best coach, the best system and the best depth. Leonard, in turn, was not a dominant individual to the extent of a Russell Westbrook and James Harden.

Since the moment Leonard left Game 1 with a re-aggravation of his sprained left ankle, the Spurs were outscored 443-356.

Had this happened to any other team and star player, the prevailing takeaway would have been how thin that team is, how overly reliant they are on their star, how they quit on their season in the face of adversity.

For Pop and the Spurs, it was, "What could have been?"

The irony of that question is that the answer lies not in the realm of the unknown, but in the actual results.

Winning an NBA championship requires so much. You need not only a superstar, but a superstar capable of outdueling other superstars. On top of that, you need a dominant secondary star, terrific tertiary players and capable, versatile depth. You also need tremendous coaching, a never-say-die attitude and a little luck.

The 2016-17 Spurs had very few of those things. Their secondary star, LaMarcus Aldridge, was wildly inconsistent throughout the regular season and playoffs. Their tertiary players were old (Manu Ginobili, Tony Parker) or extremely limited on one end (Pau Gasol, Jonathon Simmons, Dewayne Dedmon). Their depth was inexperienced and underwhelming (Kyle Anderson, Dejounte Murray, Davis Bertans).

Their attitude was far from never-say-die. They seemed to completely fold following the end of their gut-wrenching Game 1 loss. The Warriors are an unrelenting beast like no other, but that Kawhi-less Spurs team that beat the Rockets by 39 points a round prior was nowhere to be seen. Their complete lack of fight runs contrary to what everyone has come to know about Pop's Spurs, and thus, their sorry effort has been largely denied, ignored or at least apologized for.

And no, they did not have luck, either. Parker went down in Round 2, and their best player missed over 80 percent of the conference finals. But it takes more than luck to win a championship. The way the Spurs played up and down the roster these last three-and-a-half games proved that luck is only one of many things they lacked this season.

2. Warriors' small lineup plays big

Facilitated by Zaza Pachulia's injury and an opportunity for experimentation, Mike Brown finally started small in Game 4.

The experiment worked, particularly because the Warriors played big. They won the rebounding battle, 53-41. That the giant Spurs failed to work a Warriors team down its best rebounder on the glass is one thing. The distribution of Golden State's rebounds is another:

Draymond Green	8
Kevin Durant	12
Stephen Curry	5
Patrick McCaw	4
Ian Clark	2
Matt Barnes	1
Shaun Livingston	1
Andre Iguodala	6
Klay Thompson	6
David West, JaVale McGee, Damian Jones (combined)	7

San Antonio's dreadful effort was certainly at play here. So too, however, was Golden State's swarming activity and connectedness. Every time a Spurs shot went up, whichever Warrior was matched up on San Antonio's big would box out. Guards and wings would crash in clusters and Tyson Chandler the ball to the perimeter, while the other guards and wings would position themselves to come up with the tap outs.

This type of strategy will be tougher to employ against Cleveland (assuming it makes it through to the Finals). Tristan Thompson and Kevin Love are tougher to box out than Aldridge and Gasol. The Cavs have shooters who are harder to leave on the perimeter, and they have an offense more capable of putting the ball in the bucket, thus reducing defensive rebound opportunities.

Still, the augmented death lineup (Patrick McCaw started Game 4 instead of Andre Iguodala) proved why small-ball is, or should be, the Warriors preferred way of playing. It allows them to do so many things so well, and is a whole lot better at the things it supposedly can't do than the coaching staff seems to trust it to be.

3. Ian Clark and Patrick McCaw minutes battle remains undecided entering finals

The Warriors are as positionless a team as there is in the NBA, so mapping out their minutes can be difficult.

At a basic level, the 96 available guard minutes are distributed like so: Curry (40), Thompson (25-30, as he plays 10-15 at forward) and Livingston (15). That leaves 10-15 for Clark and McCaw.

Throughout the first three rounds, minutes have been plentiful for the Warriors' fourth and fifth guards. Injuries to Durant, Livingston and Matt Barnes have opened the door, as have several non-competitive games.

The same circumstances could arise in the Finals, but the Warriors coaching staff must plan their rotation under the presumption of health and competitive contests. If things play out otherwise, you go from there.

Until then, they must decide who will get the first crack at Finals minutes. That decision will have to be based solely on matchup, as the other two criteria—overall skill and recent level of play—are complete washes.

Clark is clearly a better scorer. He shoots the three with more confidence, has quietly developed one of the league's better arrays of runners and floaters, and leverages a lesser shooting reputation than that of Thompson to similarly successful back cuts. He's also having a 50-40-90 postseason.

McCaw is solid offensively. He's an average shooter, but makes quick reads as a passer that may serve him well against dialed-in defenses. At the same time, his relative mediocrity and hesitance from deep will embolden Cleveland to help off of him in a way they cannot, or should not, from Clark.

Defensively, the two are not close. Clark is competitive and competent, but does not have the length, instincts or IQ of McCaw. Neither can handle size, but McCaw is better suited to contain Irving, help on LeBron drives and occasionally break up a fast break with a deflection or chase-down block.

Then again, the bulk of the Clark/McCaw minutes will likely not come against Cleveland's starters. If Deron Williams is in the game, Clark may make more sense as a guy to exploit him offensively and stick with him on defense.

It's unclear which direction the Warriors coaching staff will go. To this point, both players have earned those minutes equally.