LONDON --
It's rare that you can identify precisely when a formation or a style of play fell out of fashion, but in the case of the diamond it's possible.
On April 5, 2011, Internazionale faced Schalke 04 at home in the UEFA Champions League quarterfinal. Twice Inter took the lead, but in the end it was well beaten 5-2, although in truth the margin could have been even greater. It was a stunning result, one few had predicted, and that was, frankly, an embarrassment for the defending European champion.
The causes were easy to define. Jose Mourinho had left to be replaced as coach by Leonardo, while the break-up of the squad was already under way. On the pitch, Leonardo's use of a midfield diamond left his side hideously exposed to Schalke's fullbacks. Atsuto Uchida and Hans Sarpei found themselves with huge amounts of space in front of them to attack and took full advantage, surging forwards to outman in midfield at every opportunity. Given that most fullbacks these days are primed to offer additional attacking width, it was hard to see how the diamond could ever cope.
Yet over the past two seasons, the diamond has re-emerged. At Liverpool last season, Brendan Rodgers began using the diamond with Steven Gerrard sitting deep in midfield, Jordan Henderson and Philippe Coutinho (or Lucas or Joe Allen) to the sides and Raheem Sterling at the tip behind Luis Suarez and Daniel Sturridge. It was an unusual approach partly because Gerrard is not a natural holder, but more because Sterling is not the sort of player who would usually be used as the central creative midfielder.
Traditionally that role went to the schemer, a skillful creator who could envision the whole of the attacking part of the pitch and slide passes to his forwards -- a player such as Zvonimir Boban, Sandro Mazzola or Pele. In South America, Argentina in particular, a myth grew up around the position of the enganche-- the hook -- between midfield and attack. Juan Roman Riquelme, mournful and stately, as slow of foot as he was quick of brain, became the icon for the supposedly dying art of the No. 10.
Liveerpool's Sterling, for example, is not that type of player. He is skilful and creative, but he is a dribbler, blessed with a rare combination of pace and technical ability. There has always been a tendency in Britain, perhaps because of the way until recently the center of pitches would become mudbaths, for skillful players to be consigned to the firmer ground of the flanks. Even trying to leave aside that prejudice, Sterling has all the attributes of a natural winger.
Playing him centrally, though, has proved effective, both for Liverpool and England's game against Switzerland earlier this month. In part, that's because his pace is being deployed in an area of the pitch in which it is unusual to find pace. Few centerbacks are rapid, the tendency having been to stock the position with tall, solid players who are good in the air. Similarly, many holding midfielders end up playing there precisely because of their lack of pace; the idea is that they have more time, that in a deeper role their reading of the game takes precedence. Sterling, then, has created panic by being fast in an area of the pitch that has for a long time been a refuge for the relatively slow.
But perhaps the more interesting development is Sterling's interaction with the air ahead of him. The reason why Liverpool's diamond wasn't outflanked by attacking fullbacks last season was that the two center-forwards were both adept at pulling wide. The effect of that was twofold; fullbacks became wary of charging forward, knowing they could suddenly find themselves having to backtrack to deal with Suarez and Sturridge; while the central defenders suddenly found themselves with nobody to mark, and a space in front of them for Sterling to use for acceleration. Sterling thus took on one of the more dangerous facets of the false nine -- his capacity to come from deep -- while the team still had two center-forwards to act as outlets if Liverpool needed to go long and direct from the back.
It was the same with England, with Danny Welbeck and Wayne Rooney drifting to the flanks to check the advance of the Swiss fullbacks, Stephan Lichtsteiner and Ricardo Rodriguez, while creating space for Sterling. Fascinatingly, on Saturday, the tactic was used against Liverpool, West Ham having Enner Valencia and Diafra Sakho pulling wide and liberating Stewart Downing through the middle; he responded with arguably his best game for West Ham, another winger revelling in the center.
Manchester United has also switched to the diamond over the past fortnight, although its interpretation is more traditional, the No. 10 role being occupied by either Juan Mata or Wayne Rooney. In its case, in fact, the diamond seems a minor development from the 3-5-2, with Daley Blind coming in for a central defender and operating just in front of the other two centerbacks rather than alongside them, and the wingers dropped back a few yards to become fullbacks.
But it's the Liverpool model that is fascinating in terms of the evolution of tactics: A diamond that can cope with being narrow, and that manages to accommodate elements of a front two and a false nine in the same side.
