It was my first time in the draft room, the Great Room of Mystery and Manipulation for football junkies, and here I was witnessing just the kind of earth-shattering conspiracy all those years of watching on television and soaking up every bit of information and misinformation had led me to believe happened in every draft room, every year.
On the floor at Radio City Music Hall in New York, the two Browns representatives sat smiling -- per instruction -- in case one of the television cameras caught them, one on the phone back to Berea and the draft room. In front of them was a card, already filled out, with the name Haloti Ngata, defensive lineman, Oregon.
There were three or four different people on the phone back at Browns Headquarters in Berea, behind closed doors in the draft room. One of them, personnel executive Bill Rees, was on the phone with Ngata, chatting him up, asking about his family, telling him to smile because the television cameras would find him soon.
They did. He smiled widely.
A few seats down from Rees was general manager Phil Savage, who was on the phone with his mentor, friend and counterpart at the Baltimore Ravens, Ozzie Newsome. The Browns -- Savage, Romeo Crennel and most of the draft room -- had decided to prioritize the pass rush and Kamerion Wimbley over interior players Ngata and Broderick Bunkley. There were a few nervous moments from pick Nos. 8-11, but when the Browns came on the clock and both Wimbley and Ngata were on board, the plan was in motion.
**
For three drafts, from 2006-08, Savage let me sit in the draft room when I was writing for ClevelandBrowns.com. It was a privilege, first of all, to be invited beyond those doors and into a place that holds such intrigue for football fans. There really aren't many secrets in the NFL, but each team holds at least a few every year in regard to positioning and planning for the one time all year that every team is guaranteed to make itself better.
At least that's how it's supposed to go.
What I actually wrote those years was highly edited, as per the policy of just about every official team website, but what I saw was unfiltered. I never was asked to leave the room or cover my ears -- my mom still does that to me, but no one in the draft room ever did -- at any point during the discussion.
There's plenty of discussion, but I was surprised that most of it was casual, non-confrontational and at a regular, relaxed pace. Savage and those he relied on most never felt pressured or rushed. They'd stacked their board and let things play out, rarely making tweaks. In 2008 he started the draft's final day with an impromptu meeting to remind everyone that the Browns had graded the cornerbacks extensively and just because the Browns had a need they wouldn't trade up or reach for two particular players.
The two guys he specifically talked about have spent more time on the waiver wire than on the field in their respective careers. You get some right (Joe Thomas, D'Qwell Jackson, Jerome Harrison, Lawrence Vickers, Ahtyba Rubin), you get some sort of right (Braylon Edwards, Wimbley, Eric Wright) and you get some wrong (Brady Quinn, Antonio Perkins, Travis Wilson).
The draft. You just never know.
For those in the room, most of the time during the draft is actually spent sitting back and watching, just like Joe Fan does in his favorite recliner. Those in the draft room find out about most trades via the television, at the same time everyone else does, and they gripe, disagree or nod accordingly with the army of analysts and broadcasters breaking down just like Joe Fan does.
What you'll see tonight on two different, simultaneous, jazzed-up broadcasts is the very definition of made-for-TV drama. The heavy lifting is usually done in the weeks and months before the draft. Once another team picks a player he's gone forever, with one young scout having the job of removing his name card from the draft board at the front of the room and placing it on the wall in the back, where every team's picks are listed for quick reference.
The actual draft board, with players ranked horizontally by position and vertically by grade, sat at what would be considered the front of the room. There were generally 120-150 players on the actual board, narrowed down from probably 500 at the start of the previous college season and in the area of 300 at the initial, full-staff draft meetings.
For at least two of the years, the scouts in the draft room had filled out their own mock draft sheets, just like every genius on the radio and every fan on the message boards does. The information is more solid and better-researched in the draft room, but the mystery of what's coming next remains.
**
There's no padlock on or high-tech security clearance needed to enter the Browns' draft room. There are motorized drapes, though, that cover the work that's done and posted on three-inch magnetic strips on the board.
Trade secrets. That's 10 percent sarcasm and 90 percent reality. Teams invest millions of dollars, thousands of hours and thousands of miles into getting the draft right. The payoff is supposed to come each fall.
I'd say from experience that the Browns have very good, very sharp scouts. One of the most interesting things I never really thought about before my draft-room experience was how they spend 10 months working their tails off with no guarantee their team will either draft or even have the opportunity to draft the guys each individual scout has either recognized or "stood on the table" for. Savage had a system that allowed each scout to "red star" a player he really liked or thought was better than his grade indicated and "black star" a player that scared the scout, for reasons involving health or character or something that could prevent the team from getting the desired return on investment.
These decisions have to be team decisions, made with the short-term and long-term picture in mind. There should always be some sort of consensus, and the opinions of those who spend the most time digging into these players need to matter.
This is why you take a big risk when you draft for need over value and talent. This is why you just don't win when you give absolute power to a Butch Davis or an Eric Mangini.
There wasn't much cheering (besides immediately following the Joe Thomas and Brady Quinn picks) during my time in the draft room. There were sighs of relief and a few high-fives when certain players were drafted by other teams -- players the Browns didn't want to have to make a decision on. Troy Smith is probably the example I best remember. The Browns had already had Quinn, but they'd made the decision before the draft that bringing Smith as a Cleveland kid at the game's most important position wouldn't be something they wanted to tackle (see Frye, Charlie, who was still on the roster) or deal with.
That folks in the draft room were actually glad he went to the Ravens says a little more about the Browns' true evaluation of Smith.
The biggest groan I ever heard in the draft room came when the Steelers took Santonio Holmes late in the first round in 2006; the Bad Guys had done it again. During the discussion in the second round in 2007 of whether or not to trade with the Cowboys and get Eric Wright, Savage referenced the Steelers specifically and the Browns' need to get players -- like they'd done earlier that day with Thomas -- who could help them win in Heinz Field.
Twice I remember scouts actually laughing out loud at the Bengals picking players who had been taken off the Browns' board due to character concerns and/or pending legal issues.
The draft. You just never know.
**
As I watched Savage on the phone with Newsome and the Browns on the clock in 2006, what I had hoped was high-level espionage actually became a calm conversation between friends. The Browns were executing an elaborate smokescreen with Ngata being shown on the phone on TV and a card in New York already filled out with his name. Newsome must have smelled at least a little bit of smoke, and he was able to talk Savage down from the price of a fourth-rounder to a sixth to swap spots and draft Ngata.
The Browns got Wimbley. They were building a 3-4 defense, and Savage had talked about Wimbley using one pass-rush move in the 2005 season opener that was better than the sum of the moves of the outside rushers the Browns had on their roster. Linebacker was next, and the Crimson blood in Savage had him back on the phone and exploring a move up to get DeMeco Ryans.
He couldn't get a deal done, and Ryans went to the Texans. D'Qwell Jackson was next on the board, with a big drop-off after him. The Browns had to make a move, and their signing the month before of LeCharles Bentley allowed them to trade Jeff Faine to the Saints as a part of a package to move up and get Jackson.
Bentley got hurt on the first day of training camp. That's the summer the Browns had to go through nine different centers because of injury, suspension and circumstance during camp.
Nobody does bad luck like the Cleveland Browns.
**
The 2007 draft became the big one for the Browns, but it started with no elaborate plan like the previous year's draft. The Browns had actually called Quinn the night before and told him they wouldn't be taking him at No. 3 as a service to an Ohio kid who'd grown up dreaming of playing in Cleveland. Savage was fascinated by fellow Mobile, Ala., native JaMarcus Russell, but he was a virtual lock at No. 1 and the Browns had zeroed in on Thomas.
Savage had some ideas of a trade up and a shot at another marquee player, but not Quinn. He followed up on some previous discussions with Minnesota about a potential blockbuster, but the Vikings couldn't turn down the chance to draft a talent like Adrian Peterson at No. 7. He called Buffalo and the Jets about a potential move into the early teens, but those teams called back saying the board had gone the way they'd hoped.
The Bills wanted and got their guy in Marshawn Lynch. Ditto the Jets and Darrelle Revis. With Peterson and those two either off the board or off limits, Savage started thinking about the early second-round pick and players in that range. The overall assumption was that Miami would take Quinn at No. 9. If the Dolphins didn't, the Bills or Rams probably would.
Only when Quinn was still on the board in the late teens -- and only when Savage saw that the Ravens were within striking range of making their own deal to get him -- did he and the others in the room start making serious calls about making a trade. Finally, at 22, a pick before the quarterback-needy Chiefs and seven in front of the Ravens, Savage and Cowboys owner Jerry Jones worked out a deal.
Later that night, they made another significant trade that allowed the Browns to get back into the second round and get Eric Wright. There was no pre-planning, no elaborate scheme. Savage wasn't even sure he'd ever even spoken to Jones before.
"Jerry Jones is going to take me to a fancy dinner at the Combine," Savage joked. "I guess."
The 2008 draft was different. Quinn cost the Browns their first-rounder, a later-than-Dallas-expected pick after the Browns went 10-6, and the second- and third-rounders had been invested in defensive linemen Corey Williams and Shaun Rogers via trade. The Browns thought their window was opening, and they didn't pick until the fourth round, No. 104 overall.
Linebacker Beau Bell was a miss -- if fourth-rounders truly are "misses" -- and the classic example of what can happen when teams draft for need. Martin Rucker was a big, super-productive in college tight end who was drafted mostly to help in practice. Kellen Winslow did almost zero offseason work at the time and was always at least a little limited during two-a-days.
A year later, after Savage and Crennel were fired and Eric Mangini became Head Honcho Of Every Miniscule Detail, Winslow was traded to Tampa Bay for the pick that eventually became Mohamed Massaquoi, the crown jewel of the worst second round in Browns history and maybe the worst by any team, ever. Later in 2009, Rucker got cut. Bell was gone, too.
The draft, you just never know.
The Browns started the sixth round by taking defensive tackle Ahtyba Rubin, a guy who'd been a junior college player, then a good player on a bad Iowa State team, and had been good enough as a late addition to the Senior Bowl that teams had to take notice. Later in the sixth round two scouts spoke up for Wisconsin receiver Paul Hubbard. Savage challenged them to explain why the Browns needed a receiver -- Braylon Edwards had just had his career year, Donte Stallworth had just been signed to a high-dollar contract -- and both said Hubbard, basically a track guy with little football polish, was worth taking a shot on.
I believe I heard the term "gamble on greatness." Ahem. Gambles tend to lose.
We watch and we sweat drafts all the way through for a reason, and the main reason is that great players come from all sorts of backgrounds and all sorts of draft situations. Today, Rubin is one of the highest-paid defensive tackles in the game and a cornerstone for a defense that has a chance to be pretty good. Back then, he was a sixth-rounder, a guy we as a website had to scramble to find photos and video of and a guy that made Crennel almost giggle every time he called him "Tuba."
Gerard Warren goes third overall, Rubin goes in the sixth round.
The draft. You just never know.
