Washington Commanders
Jay Gruden didn't want the Redskins to score their game-winning touchdown
Washington Commanders

Jay Gruden didn't want the Redskins to score their game-winning touchdown

Published Dec. 14, 2016 8:38 a.m. ET

The Washington Redskins saved their season Sunday on a 25-yard touchdown run by Chris Thompson with 1:53 left in the team's divisional battle with the Philadelphia Eagles. Thompson cut left, then scampered down the sideline to give Washington a 27-22 lead. Great play, right? Go-ahead touchdown with under two minutes left. Universal thumbs up? Not exactly: After the game, 'Skins coach Jay Gruden wasn't sure he wanted Thompson to score the touchdown, reigniting one of the more fascinating strategic debates in football.

Said Gruden after the game:

"I think I was glad he scored, but I think that in hindsight, it would've have been the smartest thing to do to take a knee."

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Scoring so early gave Philly the ball with 1:53 left and one timeout -- plenty of time to get a touchdown against a Redskins defense that isn't so much a sieve on third down as it is Niagara Falls.

Ideally, in Gruden's world, the Redskins would have downed the ball after the first down, exhausted Philadelphia's last timeout and then kicked the field goal as time expired, thus ridding Washington of those tenuous 90 seconds when the Eagles marched down the field and got the ball to the Redskins' 14-yard line, before a second-down sack of Carson Wentz forced a fumble that ended the game.

In the ever-evolving world of NFL strategy, the take-a-knee plan has become one of the more interesting developments of the past 10 years. It was those very Eagles who made the play en vogue at the end of the last decade when running back Brian Westbrook was free for a touchdown that would have put Philly up 17-6 with 2:19 left against the Cowboys. But instead of running into the end zone, Westbrook fell to the turf at the one with the full knowledge that because Dallas didn't have any timeouts his Eagles could run out the clock.

Westbrook's play was heady though less necessary than in other circumstances -- the touchdown would have made it a two-score game giving Dallas almost no chance of coming back. On Sunday's play and earlier this year in that wild Cowboys-Steelers game, the touchdowns only put the teams up by a single score. They'd taken the lead but then handed the keys right back to their opponents.

The same thing happened in Super Bowl XLVI when, with just over a minute left and the New York Giants down two points, the Patriots let Ahmad Bradshaw score to put the Giants up 21-17. Rather than slowly await their impending doom, New England willingly took the hit to get the ball back with 57 seconds left. They never really threatened after that -- the game ended when time expired with the Pats at their own 49-yard line -- but having some-percent chance of winning was better than the zero they'd have had if Bradshaw had taken the knee and the Giants had run the clock down to kick the game-winner.

Of course, it isn't really zero percent though, is it? A 19-yard field goal is the definition of chip shot, but kickers have missed before and will miss again. Can you really give up the chance to score points that you're not guaranteed to get back?

Playing for future points runs is spiritually similar to the nearly universal NFL axiom that you never take points off the board. (Meaning: If a team kicks a field goal and a defensive penalty gives the offense a first down, you keep those three points because, hey, anything could happen.) Of course, that rule was popularized in the old, conservative NFL, when quarterbacks weren't protected like 1930s mob bosses, teams would punt on 4th-and-2 from their opponents' 41-yard line and nobody had heard of metrics. There's a whole new outlook on taking points off the board today, namely, do it. Go get your seven.

In the end though, whether to kneel or score or kick is like hundreds of other decisions NFL coaches make every Sunday. It's all dependent on the situation. For these specific decisions though, it can be helpful to put yourself in the mindset of the other team: What do you think they want you to do?

Back in that Super Bowl, the Patriots clearly wanted Bradshaw to get that touchdown. They let him get it and Tom Coughlin happily took the gift, preferring to get the points and leave nothing to chance on the offensive end. He was right (it worked), but he was wrong (in theory). Bill Belichick's gambit was one a coach would take 100 times out of 100: Do you want Tom Brady to have a chance of going 80 yards in 57 seconds with one timeout or pin your hopes to the infinitesimal chance a team fails to convert a 19-yarder? Coughlin should have ridden with his kicker, fully aware of what the Pats have done in situations more dire than that.

At least you can defend Coughlin's thinking. Points are a precious commodity not guaranteed to any team. The Westbrook scenario, on the other hand, isn't even a decision. If you're winning and can run out the clock, you keep the ball and run out the clock.

As for Sunday, it's kind of stunning that Gruden, whose kicker has missed the most field goals in the NFL this season and pushed a chip-shot game-winner in London that led to a tie that could be the difference between a playoff berth and not, would have so much confidence in said kicker with the season on the line.

Thompson had to score the touchdown because, at that point, there wasn't really any other scenario. It was second-and-6 from the Eagles 25. The game was very much in doubt when the snap was taken. You aren't thinking long-term when the end zone is a quarter-field away. With the benefit of hindsight, sure, playing for the field goal would be the higher percentage move. At the time though, such a thought was a few steps ahead of where the Redskins were at. Football isn't chess. You play each down you're given, then go from there.

It's a debate that'll forever continue because it's not a zero-sum decision and we love nothing more than debating hypotheticals. But Gruden, who didn't really know whether he was happy about the touchdown, indirectly made the best case for it.

"There's no guarantees," he said. "[We've] learned that the hard way."

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